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I. Introduction
Grey market imports have received varying and often contradic-
tory treatment from U.S. courts, the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission ("ITC" or "Commission"), and the executive branch.' The
trade and economic problems presented by these imports have so
affected U.S. industry that Congress officially urged the Reagan Ad-
ministration to present a grey market policy statement by the end of
1985.2 Although the Administration appointed an inter-agency
working group 3 to formulate a comprehensive policy, the group only
succeeded in underscoring the difficulty of the issues involved. The
working group produced six different policy options, but was unable
to recommend any single alternative to the Administration. 4 Judicial
and administrative fora have been equally unsuccessful in providing
* Associate, Debevoise and Plimpton, Washington, D.C. Clerk for Judge Duvall at
the International Trade Commission during the Duracell litigation; B.A. Regis College;
M.A. Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver; J.D. 1986, Ge-
orgetown University Law Center. The views expressed by the author do not necessarily
reflect the views ofJudge Duvall or the International Trade Commission.
** Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom, Washington, D.C. Member of
the bar of the District of Columbia. The views expressed herein are solely those of the
authors and should not be attributed to the International Trade Commission.
I See infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
2 S. REP. No. 133, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985). In May 1984, the Working Group
on Intellectual Property of the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade solicited infor-
mation on grey market goods and their effect on U.S. industry. See 49 Fed. Reg. 21,453
(1984). Extended response time was announced in 49 Fed. Reg. 29,509 (1984). Over
1,000 responses were received. INSIDE U.S. TRADE, April 26, 1985, Annex. The responses
indicate that grey market imports are a growing problem for many U.S. industries.
" The working group was composed of officials from the Office of Management and
Budget, Council of Economic Advisors, U.S. Trade Representatives Office, Justice Depart-
ment. and the Departments of Commerce, State, and Treasury. INSIDE U.S. TRADE, supra
note 2.
4 The following options were presented to the Cabinet Council on Commerce and
Trade:
i. Maintain the present policy of allowing grey market imports where the
foreign and U.S. trademark owners are related and the foreign articles bear a
recorded trademark authorized by a U.S. owner.
ii. Allow grey market imports, but impose mandatory labeling to inform
consumers that grey goods are neither authorized nor warranted by the U.S.
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guidance for the development of a national grey market import pol-
icy because of the ambiguities in U.S. trademark and trade laws.
This article provides an introduction to the fundamental legal
and policy issues that have produced these ambiguities and examines
the roles that common law, as well as, statutory and administrative
developments have played in the current debate. Because a viable
grey market policy remains elusive, this article highlights the major
areas of the controversy and problems confronting policy-makers.
The varying nature of grey market imports contributes to the
difficulty of forming a grey market policy. Although grey market im-
ports may be broadly defined as unauthorized imports bearing U.S.
registered trademarks, they arise in a number of distinct commercial
relationships. For example, a U.S. trademark owner, who manufac-
tures his trademarked goods in the United States may license a for-
eign manufacturer or establish a foreign subsidiary to produce and
sell goods under his trademark. This arrangement may specify that
the foreign-made trademarked goods are to be sold exclusively
abroad. If these goods are subsequently imported into the United
States, they are grey market goods because the U.S. trademark
owner did not authorize their importation. In this example, unau-
thorized imports compete with domestically produced goods; how-
ever, both bear identical trademarks. 5
A second category of grey market imports, parallel imports, in-
volves unauthorized imports that compete with unauthorized im-
ports. This occurs when a U.S. trademark holder owns the
trademark and exclusive importation rights to a foreign-made trade-
marked good. If a third party imports the same foreign-made trade-
marked items, that party circumvents the exclusive license held by
the U.S. trademark owner, and the imports are part of the grey mar-
ket.6 A third group of grey market imports encompasses trade-
marked goods manufactured in the United States for export. These
trademark owner, and are not subject to the same warranty and service bene-
fits as U.S. goods.
iii. Amend § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982)) to
make it easier to challenge grey market imports before the U.S. International
Trade Commission.
iv. Continue to allow the entry of grey market imports that are identical to
their domestic counterparts.
v. Allow the entry of grey market imports only if the infringing trademark is
removed or obliterated.
vi. Prohibit grey market imports without the written consent of the U.S.
trademark owner.
See INSIDE U.S. TRADE, supra note 2.
5 See, e.g., Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 823, (Int'l Trade Comm'n
1984), disapproved by President Reagan pursuant to 19 U.SC. § 1337(g) (1982), 50 Fed. Reg.
1655, reprinted in 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 862, appeal dinissied sub foa., Duracell, Inc. v. United
States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Duracell.
(i See, e.g., Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984),
aj.d, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).
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goods may become grey market items if, once exported, they are im-
ported into the United States without authorization of the U.S. trade-
mark holder. 7
While their form may change, all grey market goods share cer-
tain characteristics. Grey market goods can injure U.S. industries be-
cause they often are sold in the United States at a substantially lower
price than the goods against which they compete. These cheaper im-
ports, bearing trademarks identical to the authorized product, can
capture a large portion of a market in a relatively short time. As a
result, grey market goods can adversely affect domestic producers
and industries that are dependent on U.S. manufacturing, as well as
other American property interests.
Because grey market disputes frequently involve well known
trademarks 8 held by large companies, vast amounts of capital and
numerous domestic jobs could be lost to foreign manufacturers of
grey market goods. In addition, international investment may de-
crease. U.S. firms might be less likely to expand internationally if
goods they manufacture overseas may return to compete against
them in the U.S. market.
The law governing grey market imports is inconsistent and in
transition. The Lanham Act 9 and section 526 of the Tariff Act of
193010 provide statutory protections against trademark infringe-
ment. Although section 526 prohibits the unauthorized importation
of goods bearing a U.S. trademark,"I the effect of this statute on grey
market imports has been circumscribed by Customs Regulation Sec-
tion 133.21 (c)(1)-(3). This regulation provides an exception permit-
ting unauthorized trademarked goods to enter the United States
when the U.S. trademark Owner and the foreign source of the goods
are related companies or part of the same company.12 The validity
of this Customs' exception in relation to section 526 is at the heart of
the legal debate over grey market imports.' 3
The fact that law and policy pertaining to grey market imports
are simultaneously under review in three different fora exacerbates
this trade problem. Some courts have given relief to U.S.
trademarket holders, 14 while others have allowed the grey market
7 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 824 n.2.
8 Neuner, 120 N.Y.L.J. 1.
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1124 (1982). The Lanham Act provides civil remedies for
trademark infringement.
10 19 U.S.C. § 526 (1982).
See id.
12 See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3) (1985).
S-' See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1569.
14 See A. Bouriois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923) (per crian); A. Bourjois &
Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923); Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp.
19 (S.D. Fla. 1985); iqnfra notes 28-41, 46-61, 64-80 and accompanying text.
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imports to continue.' 5 The International Trade Commission ex-
cluded grey market goods in one case, only to have the President
veto the Commission's action and admit the imports.' 6 Further-
more, the executive branch has not been consistent in its approach.
Judicial and administrative determinations have recently docu-
mented the Customs Bureau's inconsistency in dealing with this
issue. 17
The complexity of the policy issues involved further complicates
matters. The current public policy debate must embrace such di-
verse issues as U.S. obligations under international trade agree-
ments, domestic economic policy, the activities of multinational
enterprises (MNE) and antitrust considerations, and the role of intel-
lectual property rights in international trade.
The questions posed by grey market goods include a wide range
of both legal and policy problems. In order to understand how these
problems evolved, it is necessary to examine trademark law and its
relationship to international trade.
II. The Common Law Territoriality Doctrine
U.S. trademark protection and international trade have had an
uneasy relationship. While U.S. trademark owners have lobbied for
laws to protect domestic trademarks by excluding unauthorized im-
ports, importers of trademarked items have insisted that a free flow
of goods is vital to international trade and that trademark rights
should not create trade barriers. The tension produced by these
competing interests is reflected in U.S. common law and its applica-
tion to statutory provisions. To understand the common law devel-
opment in this area and its response to the grey market problem, the
unique characteristics of trademarks must be more fully explored.
Trademarks, like patents and copyrights, are limited monopo-
lies. However, unlike patent or copyright monopoly rights which are
created by statute, the right to a trademark comes from prior appro-
priation and use in trade. As a result, although statutes may broaden
common law trademark rights, these rights are determined largely by
judicial interpretation.'" Therefore, common law trademark protec-
tion has significantly influenced the application of statutory trade-
mark provisions.
I5 See I'ivitar, 761 F.2d at 569-70; Monte Carlo Shirt Co. Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l Am.
Corp., 707 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1983); Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trade-
marks v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), rev d, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.
1986); infra notes 21-27, and accompanying text.
16 See Duracell 225 U.S.P.Q. at 823; Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 862.
17 See Vivilar, 761 F.2d at 1568; Initial Determination ofJudge Duvall in Duracell, Inv.
No. 337-TA-165 (Int'l Trade Comm'n 1984).
18 4A R.CAI.LMANN, rIE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPEIrrION, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPO-
i.Es § 25.03 (4th ed. 1983).
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The scope of protection offered by a trademark differs from pat-
ents or copyrights. A trademark is "only indicative of rights acquired
by use and provides for procedural benefits, not monopoly rights as
in a grant of a patent."1 9 Trademarks are also intrinsically tied to the
business they represent. They are objective symbols of the goodwill
established by the trademark owner.20
A. The Universality and Territoriality Principles: Early Judicial
Treatment of Grey Market Imports
For U.S. courts, the primary difficulty with grey market imports
arises from imported goods that are genuine. Genuine goods bear
the actual trademark, not a copied or simulated trademark. Leading
cases in this area demonstrate the problems courts have had in deal-
ing with genuine goods and allegations of trademark infringement.
Appollinaris Co. v. Scherer2' illustrates both the dilemma faced by
the courts and the degree to which common law has almost reversed
itself in this field. This case arose when an English company that
owned the U.S. trademark and exclusive U.S. import rights of im-
ported Hungarian mineral water discovered that another company
was importing the mineral water into the United States. The British
plaintiff sued under U.S. trademark laws to stop the imports. The
Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York (later to become
the Second Circuit) concluded that the other importer could import
the water under the same trademark.2 2 The court reasoned that
trademark protection could not be invoked in this case because the
imported water was genuine, not a copy or counterfeit. 23 The court
held that because a trademark protects the public by "vouch[ing] for
the genuineness of the thing" trademark law offers no relief unless a
trademark were being used to falsely denote the origin of a good. 24
The court also held that the U.S. trademark owner neither had nor
could have obtained "a territorial title" to the imported item because
trademark rights, unlike patent grants, may not be subdivided into
legally cognizable territorial divisions.25
The court's analysis demonstrates the universality principle
which states that a trademark is valid if it correctly identifies the ori-
19 Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. A.J. Indus. Corp., 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665, 668
(T.M.T.A.B. 1970); see also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97-98
(1918) (trademark does not confer monopoly in proper sense but protects goodwill by
distinguishing one manufacturer's goods from another's).
20 See American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372 (1926); Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916); 1J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2:7 (2d ed. 1984).
21 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
22 See id. at 20.
23 See id.
24 Id. at 21.
25 Id.
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gin of the good to which it is attached, regardless of where the good
is sold. In this manner, the universality doctrine gives extraterrito-
rial effect to foreign trademarks that correctly denote the origin of
the goods.
Approximately thirty years later, the Second Circuit reiterated
the universality principle in another genuine goods dispute, Fred
Gretsch Manufacturing Co. v. Schoening.26 Schoening differed from Appol-
linaris because Congress had enacted a new trademark law in 1905
which prohibited the importation of copies or simulations of U.S.
trademarks. 27
In Schoening an owner of a U.S. trademark for a foreign-made
good unsuccessfully attempted to assert exclusive trademark rights,
thereby preventing another importer from bringing the goods into
the United States. The court held that applying the statute did not
change the rule in Appollinaris. The court reasoned that the statute
did not reach genuine items and under the universality approach
genuine goods were not copies or simulations that could infringe
U.S. trademarks. Therefore, the court permitted the unauthorized
genuine goods to enter the United States.28
The universality approach adopted in Appollinaris and Schoening
frustrated the expectations of U.S. companies holding exclusive
trademark rights, and proved to be short lived. Perhaps protection-
ist sentiment, or a new sense of fairness, pervaded judicial thinking
and caused the change. Whatever the underlying motive, the
Supreme Court repudiated the universality principle in A. Bourjois &
Co. v. Katzel. 29 This case involved a U.S. company that bought the
right to the U.S. trademark of a French firm from the French com-
pany.30 That company subsequently claimed exclusive U.S. import
rights and distributed the French product in the U.S. market.3 1
Later, a second importer purchased goods bearing the French trade-
mark registered to the original U.S. importer from the French manu-
facturer, and imported them into the United States. The U.S.
company alleged that the genuine items infringed its trademark and
sought an injunction to restrain the infringement. 32
The District Court for the Southern District of New York found
that the U.S. owner of the U.S. trademark had developed a U.S. mar-
ket and a concommitant goodwill for the French goods. 33 The trade-
26 238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916).
27 Trademark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 27, 33 Stat. 730 (1905).
28 See Schoening, 238 F. at 780-82.
29 260 U.S. 689 (1923).
30 See id. at 690.
31 See id. at 690-91. The same arrangement was at issue in Schoening, 238 F. at 780-81,
and Appollinaris, 27 F. at 19-20.
32 See Katzel, 260 U.S. at 691.
33 See id., 274 F. 856, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1920), rev'd, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260
U.S. 689 (1928).
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mark owner thus had established a domestic goodwill in the French
product that was conceptually separate from the French goods man-
ufactured in France and distributed elsewhere in the world.3 4 As-
serting the territoriality principle, the court reasoned that a
trademark "is genuine as a matter of law only if defendent [the other
importer] has the right to sell where plaintiff [the U.S. trademark
owner] is the exclusive owner of the trademark."' 35 The court
granted a preliminary injunction because the U.S. trademark owner
had purchased rights to the U.S. trademark from the foreign firm
and expended a great deal of money in developing goodwill for the
trademark in the U.S. market.36 In addition, the court reasoned that
a contrary finding could have a negative impact on other similarly
situated business interests by allowing a foreign firm to sell its U.S.
trademark rights to a U.S. concern and subsequently compete with
that company under the same trademark. 37
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed. Reiterating its Appol-
linaris and Schoening reasoning, the court held that the goods im-
ported by the second importer did not infringe the domestic
trademark because the goods were genuine goods covered by the
trademark. "Genuine," as interpreted by the court, meant that the
goods originated from the same manufacturer.38 According to the
universality principle's logic, there could be no infringement in a
case involving a genuine good because such good by definition can-
not be a copy or a simulation, nor can it cause confision to consum-
ers about the source of the good.
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court's analysis. Af-
firming the territoriality principle's validity, the Court reasoned that
the second importer's ownership of the goods did not give it the
right to sell them under a specific trademark.3 9 Two major points
were emphasized by the Court. First, the U.S. trademark was plain-
tiff's exclusive trademark40 because the U.S. company had purchased
exclusive trademark rights from the French firm. 4 1 Second, because
34 274 F. at 857-59.
35 Id. at 859-60 (emphasis added).
36 See id. at 859 (citing Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 403).
37 See id. at 859. Katzel was not brought under the trademark provisions of the 1905
Act, which was applied in Schoening. Instead, Katzel turned on the rights of private parties
to determine, as a matter of law, the validity of a given trademark. The court found that
the domestic company's U.S. trademark was valid, and that the identical trademark that the
French firm applied to genuine goods was invalid in the United States. Id. at 860.
38 See id., 275 F. 539, 543 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923). The court con-
trasted the territorial protections offered by patents with the different protections given by
trademarks. Trademarks denote the origin of the goods and cannot be used to limit the
sale of genuine goods. Id., 275 F. at 543. By implication, trademarks do not provide terri-
torial protection.
39 See id., 260 U.S. at 692.
40 See id. at 691-92.
41 See id. at 690.
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the U.S. public perceived the goods as originating from the plaintiff,
the French goods were sold in the United States by virtue of the
goodwill the plaintiff created, and the trademark "stake[d] the repu-
tation of the plaintiff upon the character of the goods." 42 Therefore,
the Court sustained the preliminary injunction against trademark
infringement. 43
Under Katzel, the territoriality principle provides that, because a
trademark is the creation of each country's laws, no nation's trade-
mark laws can be applied extraterritorially to create "universal" or
"global" trademarks. 44 The territoriality concept clearly applies
when genuine articles are imported into a nation where another
party owns the exclusive trademark rights to that foreign product.
However, the scope of this protection and its applicability to U.S.
trade law is uncertain. Under Katzel trademarked goods may be ex-
cluded from importation if the U.S. trademark owner has purchased
exclusive rights to the trademark from the foreign manufacturer, is
independent from the foreign manufacturer, and has developed its
own goodwill in the U.S. market.45
A U.S. district court has stated that Katzel is limited to the follow-
ing narrow range of facts: "[when] an American purchaser of do-
mestic trademark rights [is] totally independent from the foreign
manufacturer and bec[o]me[s] the complete master of the trademark
in the United States for the reason that the public recognized the
American purchaser as the sole source of goods in the United
States." '46 It is, therefore, difficult to apply the Katzel principle to
broader fact patterns. For example, its application is unclear in dis-
putes involving MNE which may own both the U.S. and foreign
trademark rights, authorize manufacture abroad, and then attempt to
keep the foreign made goods out of the U.S. market. 47 The difficulty
of applying Katzel is reflected in current applications of the law to
grey market imports.
B. Current Applications of the Law to Grey Market Imports
Two recent federal cases, Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Sup-
42 Id. at 692.
43 See id. Subsequently, the Court reaffirmed the territoriality principle in A. Bourjois
& Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923), a per curiam decision involving facts nearly identical
to those in Katzel. Katzel, however, dealt with trademark validity while the issue in Aldidge
was whether the U.S. trademark holder could prevent the importation of genuine goods
into the United States. The Court held that goods found to be infringing under the Katzel
standard could be excluded from the U.S. market.
44 See Coalition, 598 F. Supp. at 848.
45 This result underscores a fundamental purpose of a trademark, which is to symbol-
ize the local goodwill created by the local business. See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 827.
46 Coalition, 598 F. Supp. at 848.
47 See id. at 851.
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ply Co. 4 8 and Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo49 demonstrate how the
territoriality principle has been applied to facts similar to Katzel.
Both cases, like Katzel, involved a U.S. trademark owner employing
the territoriality principle in claiming that even genuine goods can
infringe a U.S. trademark. 50
In Bell & Howell plaintiff sought to enjoin another enterprise
from importing genuine "Mamiya" cameras into the United States,
claiming infringement of its exclusive trademark and distribution
right to "Mamiya" products. 5' The District Court for the Eastern
District of New York granted a preliminary injunction after applying
the territoriality principle. 52 The court held that plaintiff had estab-
lished goodwill for Mamiya goods in the U.S. market and that there
was a substantial likelihood of consumer confusion between the au-
thorized and grey market cameras. 53
The Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, holding
that the lower court had abused its discretion. 54 Because the court
determined that plaintiff failed to sustain its burden of proving irrep-
arable injury, it did not reach the merits of plaintiff's claim. 55
In Osawa this same plaintiff, under new ownership, filed suit in
the District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming
that the grey market "Mamiya" imports infringed its exclusive trade-
mark and caused irreparable injury.5 6 The Osawa court found that
plaintiff had developed separate goodwill for the "Mamiya" goods in
the United States and granted a preliminary injunction, citing Katzel
as demonstrating plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits of its
trademark claim.5 7
The court refuted the universality doctrine, noting that it fails to
reflect that trademark rights are not founded on the notion of a
transnational marketplace 58 with an international rubric of trade-
mark issuance and protection. Because the universality doctrine in-
correctly gave trademarks a legal force outside their country of
48 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated and remanded, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.
1983).
49 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
50 See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1066; Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1171.
51 See Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1064-65. In a twist of the Katzel facts, Bell &
Howell owned 50% of the Japanese manufacturer of Mamiya cameras. See id. at 1069.
Plaintiff invoked both the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1124 (1982), which provides
civil remedies for trademark infringement, and the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 526
(1982), which appears to supplement the Lanham Act. See infra notes 9-10 and accompa-
nying text.
52 See Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1063.
53 See id. at 1079.
54 See id., 719 F.2d at 46.
55 See id. at 45-46.
56 See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1165.
57 See id. at 1171. Preliminary relief was granted under § 526 of the Tariff Act and for
trademark infringement. See id.
58 See id. at 1172.
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origin, the court concluded it had to be discarded.59 In applying the
territoriality principle, the court noted that the Supreme Court has
endorsed the concept of territoriality of trademark rights in deci-
sions other than Katzel. 60 The court also cited international agree-
ments supporting the territoriality principle, including the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property6' and the Gen-
eral Inter-American Convention for Trademark and Commercial
Protection62 and held that a trademark may have a separate legal ba-
sis, as well as a different commercial significance, in each country
depending on the goodwill developed in the specific nation.63
Although the above cases narrowly applied the territoriality
principle to specific statutory provisions aimed at infringing imports,
they did not address the apparent conflict between section 526 of the
Tariff Act and Customs Regulation 133.21. Section 526 of the Tariff
Act prohibits importation of goods bearing a U.S. trademark without
the trademark owner's consent. 64 In contrast to this statute's lan-
guage, Customs Regulation section 133.21 prevents U.S. trademark
holders from excluding unauthorized imports bearing U.S. regis-
tered marks if the goods emanate from a related company.65  In
Vivitar Corp. v. United States the Court of International Trade (CIT)
and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) examined
59 See id. at 1175.
60 For example, this concept has been endorsed in cases which base territoriality on
the sovereignty of nations. Id. at 1172 (citing Ingenohl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S.
541, 544 (1927). The Court found support in the doctrine that trademark rights arise
from using a mark in a "particular geographic market" rather than a global one. See id.; see
also United Drug, 248 U.S. at 98; Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 415-16.
61 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1629, T.I.A.S. No. 6923. Article 6(3) provides: "A mark duly registered in a coun-
try of the Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in the other coun-
tries of the Union, including the country of origin." Id.
62 General Inter-American Convention for Trade Mark and Commercial Protection,
Feb. 20, 1929, 46 Stat. 2907, T.S. No. 833, art. 11; see Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 828.
63 See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1173. The court found further support in a 1962
amendment to § 32 of the Lanham Act, which repealed the requirement that a plaintiff
show confusion as to "source of origin" of the goods. See id. at 1173.
64 Section 526 provides:
[Ilt shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of
foreign manufacture if such merchandise . .. bears a trademark owned by a
citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the
United States . . . unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is
produced at the time of making entry.
19 U.S.C. § 526 (1982).
65 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(a), (c)(1)-(3) provides:
a) Articles of foreign or domestic manufacture bearing a mark or name or
simulating a recorded trademark or trade name shall be denied en-
try . . . (c) The restrictions set forth in paragraph (a) . . . do not apply to
imported articles when: (1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade
name are owned by the same person or business entity; (2) The foreign and
domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent and subsidiary compa-
nies or are otherwise subject to common control . . . ; (3) The articles of
foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade name applied under
authorization of the U.S. owner.
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the apparent conflict between the plain language of section 526 and
the Customs Regulation. 66 In this case, a corporate owner of the
U.S. VIVITAR trademark sought a declaratory judgment that the
U.S. Customs Service must exclude all unauthorized imports of VIV-
ITAR trademarked goods. Wholly-owned subsidiaries of plaintiff
were marketing VIVITAR goods overseas, but were not licensed to
sell the goods in the United States.67 Controversy arose when a
third party, unrelated to the plaintiff corporation, began importing
VIVITAR equipment without plaintiff's consent,68 and plaintiff sued
to clarify the legal effects of regulation 133.21 in light of section 526.
Under a literal reading of section 526, the unauthorized imports
could not enter the United States. Applying the exceptions to sec-
tion 526 as found in section 133.21, however, the unauthorized im-
ports could be admitted because the VIVITAR trademark was
applied to articles of foreign manufacture under authorization of the
U.S. trademark owner. 69
The CIT determined that Congress enacted section 526 in re-
sponse to the Second Circuit's holding in Katzel, and limited the
scope of the section to the facts of that case. 70 After an exhaustive
examination of the legislative history, the CIT concluded that section
526 was inapplicable when the U.S. trademark holder was related to
the foreign manufacturing company, and that section 133.21 was
consistent with congressional intent.7 ' Noting that Congress had de-
bated amending section 526 to prohibit importation of all goods
bearing a U.S. registered trademark, 72 the CIT determined that Con-
gress had specifically considered expanding the protection of section
526, but refused to do so. As a result, the court surmised that Con-
gress had intended to limit section 526 to facts similar to Katzel.73
Further proof of intent not to expand the scope of section 526 was
inferred from the fact that Congress amended the statute in 1978
without broadening the section to offer protection to U.S. trademark
holders related to the foreign manufacturer of the goods. 74 The CIT
concluded that Congress considered section 32(1) of the Lanham
66 See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 425.
67 See id. at 422-23.
68 See id.
69 See id. at 423; see also 19 U.S.C. § 526 (1982); 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3) (1985).
70 See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 426 (citing Coty, Inc. v. LeBlume Import Co., 292 F.
264, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), aft'd, 293 F. 344 (2d Cir. 1923)). Shortly after § 526 was en-
acted, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit in Katzel. See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at
428. Cf Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1175 (dicta supporting statutory language).
71 See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 425-28, 432-33.
72 The amendment purportedly was intended to compel U.S. producers to manufac-
ture domestically. See id. at 428 & n.12 (citing 71 CONG. REc. 3871 (1929)).
73 See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 428 & n.12, 435.
74 Customs Procedure Reform and Simplification Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-410,
92 Stat. 888, 903 (1978) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a), (d), (e) (1982)). For
a discussion of the amendments see Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 433.
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Act and U.S. common law adequate protection from unfair
competition. 75
On appeal, the CAFC affirmed the CIT holding on narrower
grounds. 76 The court framed the issue as whether the American
VIVITAR trademark holder could force Customs to exclude unau-
thorized imports of VIVITAR products as a matter of statutory
right. 77 Examination of the legislative history of section 526 and rel-
evant cases led the court to conclude that section 133.21s limitations
could not be read into section 52678 because Congress neither lim-
ited section 526 in the manner of the Customs regulation, nor gave
Customs legislative authority to affect the scope of section 526. 7 9
Therefore, the court held that section 133.21 does not limit a trade-
mark holder's rights under the statute, but "define[s] Customs' role
in initiating administrative enforcement of the statute." 80 The court
concluded that Vivitar and similarly situated plaintiffs can seek judi-
cial remedies such as injunctions against unauthorized imports or
damages, but cannot compel automatic exclusion of unauthorized
grey market goods.81 In short, section 133.21 was held to be a rea-
sonable exercise of Customs' authority, and specific grey market dis-
putes were deemed best left to case-by-case judicial resolution.8 2
In Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United
States, Customs' interpretation of section 526 and Customs regula-
tion 133.21 were again challenged in the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia.83 Plaintiff, a coalition of trademark owners,
sought to exclude genuine grey market goods under section 42 of
the Lanham Act 84 and section 526 of the 1930 Tariff Act. In analyz-
ing the Katzel decision, the court determined that its exclusion of
genuine imports was warranted only when U.S. trademark owners'
rights are totally independent from the foreign manufacturer, and
the U.S. trademark owner has become "the complete master of the
trademark in the U.S. [because] the public recognize[s] the American
purchaser as the sole source of goods in the U.S." '85 The court con-
cluded that Katzel was decided on its equities because the Supreme
Court considered it unfair to allow a foreign manufacturer to sell
exclusive U.S. rights to the plaintiff and subsequently establish a
75 See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 453.
76 See id., 761 F.2d at 1569.
77 See id. at 1556.
78 See id. at 1561-65. Moreover, Customs' reading of § 526 has been inconsistent.
The Vivitar court noted that the Customs Service had taken a contrary position in Bell &
Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1063. See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1568.
79 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1569.
80 Id.
81 See id. at 1569-70.
82 See id at 1555.
83 See Coalition, 598 F. Supp. at 884.
84 See id. at 846; see also supra note 9.
85 Coalition, 598 F. Supp. at 848.
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competing U.S. distributor.86 Therefore, the court held that section
42 of the Lanham Act only applies when goods copy or simulate gen-
uine marks and that genuine goods do not copy or simulate absent a
Katzel-type situation.8 7 Goods manufactured abroad by subsidiaries
of the U.S. companies under a trademark registered in the United
States, thus are not Lanham Act copies or simulations under Coalition
and may be imported without the U.S. trademark holder's consent.
C. The U.S. International Trade Commission: The Duracell Case
The Duracell case, In Re Certain Alkaline Batteries, represents the
first attempt by a U.S. MNE to protect its U.S. market by employing
the territoriality principle, sections 32(1) and 42 of the Lanham Act,
and section 526 of the Tariff Act to demonstrate a violation of sec-
tion 337 of the Tariff Act. Section 337, administered by the U.S.
ITC, prohibits unfair importation acts, including trademark, patent,
and copyright infringement, which may substantially injure domestic
industry.88
Duracell brought suit under section 33789 after other U.S. com-
panies began importing batteries produced by its wholly-owned Bel-
gian 90 subsidiary without authorization. 9' The administrative law
86 See id.
87 See id. at 848. The court found that § 42 of the Lanham Act applied to genuine
goods only in Katzel-type situations, implying that goods manufactured by these parties'
foreign subsidiaries are not counterfeits despite the territoriality principle. This under-
mines the International Trade Commission's analysis in Duracell. See infra notes 86-101
and accompanying text. See also El Greco Leather Prods. v. Shoe World, Inc., 599 F. Supp.
1380 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (retailer's sale of shoes purchased from authorized foreign manufac-
turer did not infringe). Cf Monte Carlo Shirts, 707 F.2d at 1054 (defendant manufacturer
did not infringe plaintiff's trademark when it sold to retailer "genuine" shirts for which
plaintiff had contracted, but later rejected because of late delivery).
88 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982). Cases, called investigations, first are heard by an ad-
ministrative law judge (ALJ), who issues an Initial Determination. The Commissioners
then review or adopt the ALJ's determination. If the ITC finds that all the statutory crite-
ria have been met, it can issue an order excluding the imports from the U.S. market.
Under § 1337, the President may disapprove such an exclusion order within 60 days. Id.
§ 1337(g)(2); see also 19 C.F.R. § 210.1-210.71 (1985).
89 Duracell's pursuit of a § 337 remedy rather than a civil action in federal court was
reasonable because the requisite elements of a § 337 violation existed. Territoriality-prin-
ciple analysis indicated that there was an unfair act of trademark infringement; an effi-
ciently operated domestic industry was injured and there was a high level of imports.
Under § 33 7 (g) the President can disapprove a Commission determination, as happened
in Duracell. Presidential disapprovals are based on often unpredictable policy grounds. See
19 U.S.C. § 1337(g). A civil suit for damages or an injunction would not have offered as
complete a remedy as ITC action. Unlike civil action, an ITC exclusion order would cover
all imports, including those brought in by importers who were not parties tothe litigation.
Duracell thus could avoid filing multiple suits. See In re Orion Co., 21 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 563,
571 (Ct. of Customs and Pat. Appeals 1934).
!) Duracell, Inc., a Delaware corporation, heads Duracell's corporate structure.
Duracell U.S.A. is an unincorporated division of Duracell, Inc. Duracell Belgium, N.V.
Duracell, S.A., is a wholly owned subsidiary of Duracell, International, which is in turn a
subsidiary of Duracell, Inc., the U.S. corporation. Duracell International owns the Belgian
registration of the Duracell trademark. See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 825.
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judge (ALJ) made his initial determination (ID) in July 1984, finding
that the Belgian Duracell importers had engaged in unfair importa-
tion, as proscribed in section 337, by violating sections 32(1) and 42
of the Lanham Act. 9 2 In determining that defendants had violated
the territoriality principle incorporated in section 42, the ALJ held
that Duracell's trademark has a separate existence under U.S. laws,
the trademark represents local goodwill of Duracell U.S.A., and the
use of the trademark in the United States is not separated from the
goodwill of the business it identifies. 93 The ALJ concluded that grey
market importers had violated section 32(1) because there was a sub-
stantial likelihood that consumers would be confused about the
source of the Belgian Duracells. 94
The Commission largely upheld the ALJ's determination, find-
ing violations of section 337 on six grounds. 95 The ITC affirmed the
ALJ's holding that the territoriality principle was incorporated in sec-
tion 42 and determined that importation of genuine Belgian
Duracells infringed Duracell U.S.A.'s exclusive trademark rights. 96
Because the right to exclude others from using a trademark is im-
plicit in an exclusive right to that mark,97 the Commission concluded
that the territoriality principle protects domestic mark holders from
competition with genuine grey market importers who misappropri-
91 See id. at 824. In the early 1980s the U.S. dollar rose considerably against most
European currencies, including the Belgian franc. U.S. importers began importing Bel-
gian-made Duracells. While U.S. retailers could sell the imported Duracells at the same
price as domestic Duracells, they could purchase them at roughly one half the wholesale
price. See id. at 826. By 1983 Duracell U.S.A. had lost substantial sales to the unauthor-
ized imports, estimating that it lost millions of dollars during 1983 in its New York sales
district alone. See id. at 838.
Respondents and parties filing amicus briefs included an array of importers, a major
retail chain, trade associations, the U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. owners of foreign
trademarks. Party respondent was a major importer of Duracell batteries. K-Mart was
allowed to intervene as a non-party and filed a post-hearing brief on the grey market is-
sues. On review at the Commission, the case was designated more complicated, thus giv-
ing parties greater response time. The list of amici curiae included the Association of
General Merchandise Chains, Inc., COPIAT, 47th St. Photo, Inc., and the Vivitar Corpora-
tion. See id. at 825.
112 See id. at 826, 837.
93 See Initial Determination ofJudge Duvall in Duracell, Inv. No. 337-TA-165, at 65-66
(Int'l Trade Comm'n 1984).
504 See id. at 67. See also Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 834-37.
95 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 826. The ITC found violations in other areas specific
to the Duracell facts, including misappropriation of trade dress, false designation of origin,
and violations of fair packaging and labeling laws. See id. These violations are not found in
other grey market cases and were peripheral to the Duracell finding of trademark infringe-
ment. Vice Chairman liebeler, Commissioners Eckes and Lodwick concurred in the ma-
jority opinion; Vice Chairman Liebeler authored the Additional Views, and Chairwoman
Stern and Commissioner Rohr wrote Other Views. The Other Views authors found in-
fringement, but recommended an alternative remedy. See id. at 844; itc'a notes 102-09 and
accompanying text.
96 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 826-32.
97 Id. at 829. Section 33 of the Ianham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (1982) gives a trade-
mark owner an exclusive right to use the mark.
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ate benefits of consumer goodwill that they did not create. 98
Under the Commission's analysis, the trademark was copied,
notwithstanding the fact that the goods were genuine. When sold in
overseas markets, the Duracell mark on Belgian-made batteries was
not a copy of the U.S. trademark. However, once imported into the
United States, the Belgian trademark became a copy or simulation of
the U.S. mark.99 The ITC also concluded that section 32(1)'s prohi-
bition against imports likely to mislead consumers was violated.
Pointing out that retailers sell domestic and foreign batteries for the
same price,' 0 0 the Commission reasoned that the Belgian Duracells
should be excluded because any disparities in warranty and quality
would not be noticed at time of purchase.' 0 '
Unlike the Coalition and Vivitar courts, the Commission held that
the relationship between a domestic mark holder and a foreign
manufacturer is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether sec-
tion 42 is violated, as well as whether section 337 of the Tariff Act
has been violated. According to the Commission, the issue is not
whether the parent corporation has been injured, but whether do-
mestic industry has been injured by unfair importation.1 0 2 Indeed,
Vice Chairman Liebler characterized the ITC majority as holding
that "regardless of the corporate relationship between the holder of
a U.S. trademark and a foreign trademark, the U.S. trademark holder
can exclude from the U.S. the identically marked foreign
product."10 3
1. Alternate Remedies
Although Chairman Stern and Commissioner Rohr agreed that
Duracell's trademark rights were violated, they disagreed with the
98 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 830-31. This is because the purposes of trademark law
include: (1) enabling consumers to identify and distinguish goods; (2) signifying that all
similarly marked goods come from a single source; (3) guaranteeing a level of quality;
(4) assisting in advertising the product; and (5) representing the mark owner's goodwill.
See id. at 829; 1J. MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 3:1. The ITC also reasoned that the foreign
Duracells would demand a premium, capitalizing on Duracell U.S.A's consumer goodwill
even if they were labeled as of foreign origin, because batteries are an impulse item
purchased primarily on the basis of trademark. See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 839-40.
9 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 833. The Commission relied on a liberal interpreta-
tion of "copy" as found in Aldridge, 263 U.S. at 675. Support also was found in Adolf
Coors Co. v. A. Genderson & Sons, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D. Colo. 1980) (liberal
reading of § 32 of Lanham Act to prevent misappropriation of trademark owner's
goodwill).
loo See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 835.
0 See id.
102 See id. at 838.
14)3 Id. at 843. The Commission confirmed previous rulings limiting § 526 of the Tariff
Act of 1930 to Katzel-type fact situations, holding exclusion under § 526 unavailable. See
id. at 842 (citing Vivilar, 593 F. Supp. at 420). Since the Commission found a violation of
common law trademark rights independent of the Lanham Act, the Customs Department
trademark regulations at 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 were not in issue. See id. at 832.
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majority about the appropriate remedy. Stern and Rohr contended
that exclusion of improperly labeled or misleading imports was a
better remedy than the majority's general exclusion order.10 4 They
contended that labeling goods fairly would remove any unjust advan-
tage enjoyed by importers because consumers would not pay full re-
tail prices for goods imported without the U.S. mark holders'
authorization. 10 5 The price received by unauthorized importers
would, for example, reflect the true value of a Duracell battery made
in Belgium and warranted by the Belgian manufacturer, as deter-
mined by informed consumers. Therefore, properly labeled im-
ported batteries would not earn a premium based on the strength of
Duracell U.S.A.'s consumer goodwill.' 0 6 Stern and Rohr also argued
that Duracell's U.S. goodwill would be protected by adequate label-
ing to inform consumers about the respective warranties of Belgian
and U.S. Duracells and permit them to detect disparities between the
foreign and domestic batteries. 10 7 Finally, the dissenters stressed
that labeling did not disrupt international trade to the same degree
as would an exclusion order.'08
Stern and Rohr also advocated a different application of the ter-
ritoriality principle. They emphasized that it can be used to deter-
mine if two trademarks are similar and cause confusion. Viewed in
this manner, the doctrine of territoriality is relevant only to deter-
mine what constitutes a copy or simulation. 10 9 Thus, two identical
marks can embody legally separate rights created by independent
sovereign nations without implying unfairness of the use of one mark
in the country of another. Under this theory, unfairness is predi-
cated on showing confusion and harm to consumer goodwill devel-
oped by the trademark owner and territoriality itself may not be
violated. Territoriality merely establishes that genuine goods carry
separate marks that may copy or simulate an identical mark." l0
Therefore, use of a mark is legitimate as long as the public is not
confused and is properly informed about the origin of the good.I"
104 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 845 (views of Chairwoman Stern & Comm'r Rohr).
This suggestion is consistent with some of the options developed by the President's work-
ing group on intellectual property. See supra note 4.
105 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 858 (views of Chairwoman Stern & Comm'r Rohr).
106 See id. "When a mark is used in a way that does not deceive the public we see no
such sanctity in the work as to prevent its being used to tell the truth. It is not taboo."
Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924).
107 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 858 (views of Chairwoman Stern & Comm'r Rohr).
108 See id. at 860-61 (views of Chairwoman Stern & Comm'r Rohr). This position is
more in keeping with international laws concerning trade barriers. See infra notes 149-77
and accompanying text.
l) See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 851 (views of Chairwoman Stern & Comm'r Rohr).
110 See id. (citing § 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982). Chairwoman
Stern interpreted Katzel, 260 U.S. at 639, to permit a finding that even genuine goods are
inlringing. See id. at 849.
111 See id. at 858-59; Prestonelles, 264 U.S. at 359 (use of mark permitted as long as
public is informed correctly; relabeling removed likelihood of confusion). For support of a
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2. Presidential Disapproval
While the Commission's Duracell decision presented some
novel applications of the territoriality doctrine, it was short-lived. In
January 1985, President Reagan disapproved the Commission's de-
termination in a memorandum reiterating the Government's posi-
tion in Vivitar" 12 and Coalition 113 . The President stated that the ITC
interpretation of section 42 of the Lanham Act was contrary to the
Treasury Department's interpretation.' 1 4 He concluded that ap-
proval of the ITC's determination would produce an erroneous im-
pression of official policy before his Administration had formulated
its response to the grey market problem.' 5
III. Antitrust Considerations
Because grey market cases involve market protection and create
price discrepancies, antitrust issues are a recurring feature of grey
market litigation. As is the case with general trade law in this area,
the application of antitrust law to grey market cases presents an am-
biguous picture.
In the leading case, United States v. Guerlain, Inc.,116 the Govern-
ment brought suit against U.S. distributors of French perfume. The
distributors were accused of violating sections 2 and 4 of the Sher-
man Act." 17' The Government contended they had attempted to mo-
nopolize importation and sale of foreign-made toiletries by using
section 526 of the Tariff Act to exclude competitive imports. The
Southern District Court for New York held that defendants had vio-
lated the antitrust laws.' 18
labeling remedy in grey market cases see Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 435; Atwood, Import Re-
strictions on Trademarked Merchandise-- The Role of the U.S. Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADE-MARK
REP. 301, 309 (1969); Dam, Trademarks, Price Discrimination and the Bureau of Customs, 7J. L.
& EcoN. 45 (1964).
The gravamen of trademark infringement is the use of a similar mark likely to cause
confusion. There is no infringement if the likelihood of confusion is eliminated. See
Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 851 (views of Chairwoman Stern & Comm'r Rohr). "[T]he heart
of a successful claim under [the Lanham Act] ... is a showing of likelihood of confusion,
that is, whether an appreciable number of purchasers is likely to be misled as to the source
or sponsorship of defendant's products." El Greco, 599 F. Supp. at 1390.
112 Presidential Disapproval, supra note 5, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 862. The Federal Circuit
had not decided Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1552, at this point.
I I Presidential Disapproval, supra note 5, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 862.
114 Id.
It 5 See id.
I1( United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), prob. jurisd noted
sub noai. Ianvin, Parfums, Inc. v. United States, 355 U.S. 951, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924,
vacated and remanded sub nom., Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), dismissed,
172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (three actions consolidated for trial). The dismissal was
with prejudice since the Justice Department abandoned the action, leaving defendants un-
able to prevail or appeal.
117 Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 79.
1 18 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section 2 prohibits monopolizing, or attempting to monop-
olize, trade. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1982) grants federal courts jurisdiction over § 2 offenses.
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Before the case reached the Supreme Court the Government re-
quested a remand for dismissal, stating that the litigation involved
policy issues best handled by legislation.' '9 The Government antici-
pated enactment of legislation validating its claim that section 526
did not enable a U.S. company to exclude goods produced by its
foreign affiliate from domestic markets.1 20 The Supreme Court com-
plied with the Government's request for remand, and the district
court dismissed the Guerlain action. 12 1
In 1959 the Cellar Bill, which would have removed import pro-
tection for related companies, was proposed. The Cellar Bill called
for repeal of the Tariff Act and revision of section 42 of the Lanham
Act to establish that legitimately marked products manufactured by a
foreign affiliate of a domestic trademark owner could be imported
into the United States. 12 2 The bill's justification was that profits
would eventually go to the controlling corporation and international
enterprise would be encouraged. Although counterfeit marks were
still prohibited, domestic companies could not set prices in the
United States free of competition from products purchased
abroad.' 2 3 The bill was a direct response to restraint of trade prac-
tices by MNEs attempting to isolate the U.S. market from interna-
tional competition 124  and would have removed international
exclusive distribution arrangements from protection provided by
U.S. trademark and tariff laws. The bill never passed. Furthermore,
because Guerlain was dismissed in anticipation of legislation that
never materialized, its precedential value is substantially limited.
However, exclusive distributorships involving MNEs and trademarks
are not free from antitrust attacks. 12 5
Since Continental T. V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. ,126 a rule of rea-
son standard is applied to most vertical restrictions of trade. When a
Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 90. The court concluded that defendants had attempted to mo-
nopolize, largely because the U.S. company and its French counterpart were a single inter-
national enterprise. Id. at 90-91.
1 19 Motion to vacate and remand to the district court for consideration of motion to
dismiss to be filed by the United States. Guerlain, 358 U.S. at 915. Section 526 should not
be invoked by a U.S. division of a single international company in order to divide its global
market. The relationship between the U.S. trademark holder and the foreign manufac-
turer is critical. Section 526 does not provide an exception to § 2 of the Sherman Act, and
should not be read in that fashion. See Callmann, ll'orldinarks and the Antitrst Law, II
VAND. L. REV. 515 (1969).
12 ) Brief in support of United States, motion to vacate at 6-7, Guerlain, 358 U.S. 915
(1958). See H.R. REP. No. 7234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1959; Atwood, supra note 110, at
307, 313.
121 See Guerlain, 172 F. Supp. at 107.
1'2 H.R. REP. No. 7234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1959.
123 See Atwood, supra note I 11, at 314.
124 See Vandenburgh, The Problem of Importation of Genninely Marked Goods is not a 7)'ade-
mark Problen, 49 TRADE-MARK REP. 707, 707-08 (1959).
125 Various antitrust remedies may exist in these situations. See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at
1178.
12(i 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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U.S. trademark holder excludes its subsidiary's legitimately marked
goods from the U.S. market, it controls manufacturing, distribution,
and possible retail of the goods. This may constitute an im-
permissable vertical restraint of trade when the restraint has unrea-
sonable anti-competitive effects and, particularly, when the
arrangement causes price fixing. 12 7
When the ALJ applied the rule of reason test in the Duracell case
he found no evidence that Duracell was restricting trade or artificially
inflating U.S. prices.1 28 Although price differences in Duracell bat-
teries did exist between the U.S. and European markets, there was
little evidence indicating that the price differences were not attribu-.
table to exchange rates. 129 The ALJ also held that the extensive in-
terbrand competition in the U.S. battery market negated any
inference of anti-competitive behavior on the part of Duracell.' 30
In Parfums Stern v. United States Customs Service the District Court
for the Southern District of Florida concluded that the antitrust laws
did not permit exclusion of grey market goods imported by plain-
tiff's international affiliates and refused to enjoin importation of
these goods.' 31 Plaintiff, a MNE subsidiary that owned the U.S. "Os-
car de la Renta" trademark and distributed "Oscar de la Renta"
trademarked goods worldwide, argued that the unauthorized im-
ports of "Oscar de la Renta" goods infringed its trademark rights.' 32
The court concluded that plaintiff was attempting to insulate itself
from competition with genuine goods marketed internationally by its
own foreign manufacturing sources. 133 Analagous to the Guerlain
court, the Parfums Stern court held that, because of the strong rela-
tionship between the domestic trademark owner and the foreign
manufacturer, the plaintiff was trying to monopolize imports of these
products.134
According to some commentators, the reasoning of Parfums Stern
reflects antitrust concerns mirrored in Customs Regulation section
133.21.135 Section 133.21's exclusion of related companies from
trademark protection in certain cases has been analyzed as Customs'
attempt to deal with antitrust problems inherent in exclusive distrib-
utorships and market division.' 36 This analysis' 37 is supported by
1 27 See id. at 59. It is a per se violation of § I of the Sherman Act for a manufacturer to
fix the price at which the retailer can sell the product. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407-08 (1911).
128 See Initial Determination of Judge Duvall in Duracell, Inv. No. 337-TA-165 (Int'l
Trade Comm'n 1984).
12) See id.
130 See id.
i'41 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
132 See id. at 418-19.
133 See id. at 420.
134 See id.
135 Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1177; Atwood, supra note I l1.
I3 See Osawa, 589 F. Snpp. at 1177; Atwood, supra note 111, at 313; supra note 133.
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the adoption of section 133.21 in relation to the Guerlain case.' 38 By
use of this regulation, the Customs Service refuses to permit a single
multinational concern to divide its international business goodwill
into national fragments by the use of exclusive agreements and
distributorships. 13
9
If President Reagan's disapproval of the ITC's Duracell ruling
foreshadows the policy that eventually will be adopted in this area,
Customs regulation 133.21's treatment of section 526 of the Tariff
Act and sections 42 and 32(1) of the Lanham Act probably will pre-
vail. If the Administration follows Customs' lead, companies owning
both the U.S. trademark and the foreign subsidiary manufacturing
the trademarked goods will be prevented from excluding grey mar-
ket goods because of antitrust law, and the antitrust reasoning exem-
plified in Parfums Stern will displace that offered by the ALJ in
Duracell.
IV. National Policy and Grey Market Goods
The profound need for a coherent grey market policy is illus-
trated by the differing results produced by judicial and administra-
tive reviews of grey market disputes. Although the Vivitar and
Coalition courts sustained Customs' interpretation of section 526 and
permitted the importation of genuine grey market goods produced
by a foreign concern related to the U.S. mark holder, the ITC deter-
mined that grey market imports in the Duracell case violated section
337 of the Tariff Act. 140
Policymakers in this area will have to consider a number of di-
verse factors in order to formulate a viable grey market policy.
Trademark law and trademark protection, U.S. trade law, including
questions about the desirability of excluding goods in light of inter-
national trade agreements, and possible compromises with protec-
tionist sentiment in Congress must be examined.
A. Trademark Law
According to one school of thought, importation of genuine un-
authorized goods erodes aspects of U.S. trademark law and may neg-
atively affect the public interest. Proponents of this view argue that
businesses will be more likely to invest in adequately protected
trademarks.141 Since trademarks protect consumers by identifying
137 See Coalition, 598 F. Supp. at 849-51.
1: 8 See id.
1:1.' See Callmann, supra note 119, at 524.
140 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1555; Coalition, 598 F. Supp. at 844; Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at
825. The Reagan Administration's solicitation of information from industry on the efl'ec
of imports underscores the urgency of the grey market problem.
141 Proponents of this view also suggest that U.S. firms would have incentives to de-
velop foreign markets if U.S. trademarks on foreign goods were protected. Such develop-
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goods and their respective quality, this school contends that consum-
ers ultimately will benefit from trademark investment, and that man-
ufacturers may have less incentive to develop quality goods denoted
by trademarks, both at home and abroad, if trademark investments
are not protected.1 42
In response to these arguments, Kenneth Dam contends that,
although trademarks guarantee the quality of a product, recognition
of this trademark function does not mandate exclusion of genuine
goods in the international trade situation. Dam maintains that gen-
eral trademark law provides adequate protection when goods are al-
tered or when used goods are sold as new.' 43 Therefore, exclusion is
neither the only nor the most appropriate remedy for maintaining
product quality and protecting trademark holders' goodwill. For ex-
ample, labeling the unauthorized imports may offer the most viable
solution.
Another commentator also concludes that the grey market im-
port problem should not be resolved by the trademark laws.' 44 Van-
denburgh compares international trademark use with trademark use
in the U.S. system, noting that a trademark owner licensing a subsidi-
ary to produce trademarked goods in one state could not interfere
with interstate commerce and prevent those goods from entering
other states in the national market. By analogy, he suggests that
goods made abroad under fact situations that would not constitute
trademark infringement if carried out in the United States should not
be excluded under the U.S. trademark laws." 45 Vandenburgh con-
cludes that U.S. tariff law, not trademark law, might offer the proper
avenue for excluding grey market goods.146
B. Trade Policy and, Multinational Enterprises
The correct application of the territoriality principle should not
be the sole or overriding issue in the grey market debate. Trade pol-
icy lies at the heart of the grey market problem and debate must
center on formulating a coherent policy and assessing its impact on
international trade and domestic markets. 147 In formulating a grey
ment would benefit consumers and industry because MNEs would enjoy a greater
economy of scale in advertising costs by using the same trademark internationally. Theo-
retically, U.S. industry also might benefit because the internationally used mark could in-
vite a spillover of goodwill previously established in its native country. Duracell, 225
U.S.P.Q. at 841-44.
142 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 829-30.
143 See Dam, supra note 11l, at 50-51; see also Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 829-30.
144 See Vandenburgh, supra note 123, at 707.
145 See id. at 715; see also Dam, supra note 111, at 57.
146 See Vandenburgh, supra note 124, at 713.
147 See Dam, supra note 111, at 48-49. For example, grey market policy could have a
direct effect on prices charged for protected goods. Were U.S. MNEs able to invoke § 526
of the Tariff Act or provisions of the Lanham Act to exclude genuine goods from the U.S.
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market position, policy makers must consider international trade law
and U.S. relations with its trading partners. International trade law
presumptively favors national trade policies involving minimal dis-
tortions of international trade. 14  If the United States created an
exclusionary grey market policy, a whole range of internationally
known trademarked goods could be excluded from the U.S. market.
This sort of policy would involve unacceptable disruptions of inter-
national trade because large numbers of goods would be barred en-
tirely from domestic markets."49
An effective policy also must address grey market imports pro-
duced by MNEs. Both the specific character of MNEs and their abili-
ties to restrict trade must be considered. Policy makers must balance
perceived ill effects to domestic industry with positive contributions
made by MNE imports.' 50 In the case of domestic MNEs, the bal-
ance becomes a weighing of the benefits of allowing a domestic com-
pany protected by an exclusionary grey market policy to compete
internationally against trade distortions and other problems that
such a policy might create.
C. Examples from the European Economic Community
The European Economic Community (EEC) has faced the grey
market import problem since its birth as an integrated economic re-
gion in the late 1950s. From its inception, the EEC has worked to-
wards greater economic integration of Europe through a policy
founded on free trade between EEC member nations. While it may
be argued that the EEC is a sui generis regional arrangement with little
in common with the United States, the goal of free trade between
nations is shared, at least in theory, by the United States and the
European Community. The EEC's treatment of grey market imports
therefore may enhance discussion of this problem in the United
States.
Trademark holders' rights to exclude grey market goods from
national markets are substantially restricted in the European Com-
market, the cost of similar goods in the U.S. market would rise. Theoretically, the exclu-
sion would raise domestic prices just as a tariff would. Id. at 45.
148 For example, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade reduces tariffs but pro-
hibits quantitative restrictions except in certain situations. See General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, art. XI, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 187.
149 See Dam, supra note 111, at 49.
150 SeeJ. DUNNING, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 388
(1981); see also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RESTRIC-
TIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES OF MULINATIONAL ENTERPRISES: REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE OF
EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 7 (1977); Davidow, The Seeking of a World
Competition Code: Quixotic Quest?, COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 381-82 (0.
Schachter & R. Hellawell eds. 1981); Wang, Analysis of Restrictive Business Practices by Trans-
national Corporations, COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 4-5 (0. Schachter & R. Hel-
lawell eds. 1981).
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mon Market. Underlying this practice is the principle that the EEC
should not be partitioned by exclusive distributorships that often are
based on trademark rights.' 51 The EEC's policy supports interna-
tional trade and economic integration through the free flow of grey
market imports.
To understand development of the European Community's grey
market doctrine, relevant provisions of the treaty creating the EEC
must be discussed. The Treaty of Rome' 52 generally prohibits pro-
tectionist laws, including import quotas or national regulations
which would have the same effect as a quota.' 53 Article 85 pros-
cribes business practices that affect Community trade and prevent,
restrict, or distort competition in the Common Market. Prohibited
practices include price fixing, production limits, and, importantly,
market allocation. 154
There are exceptions to this general free trade policy. For ex-
ample, article 36 states that some import controls may be justified
when they are imposed to protect industrial and commercial prop-
erty' 55 unless used to discriminate against or restrict trade between
Member States.' 56 Nonetheless, the article 36 exception does not
limit application of article 85 prohibitions of anti-competitive prac-
tices. 157 An exclusionary policy may be compatible with article 36
and remain invalid as an infringement of article 85.158 The article 36
exception to EEC free trade principles is construed strictly and lim-
151 See A. HERMANN & C. JONES, FAIR TRADING IN EUROPE 44 (1977).
152 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. II [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome].
153 See id. arts. 30-34.
154 See id. art. 85. Article 85 provides in pertinent part:
The following practices shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Com-
mon Market: all agreements . . . which are designed to prevent, restrict or
distort competition within the Common Market or which have this effect.
This shall, in particular, include ... direct and indirect price fixing; produc-
tion, market, technical development or investment controls; market-sharing
or the sharing of supply sources; discriminatory trade practices; and restric-
tive trade agreements.
Article 85 only concerns agreements between independent commercial entities. It thus
does not apply to agreements between a parent and a subsidiary concerning the allocation
of tasks within the enterprise. The Commission will examine such agreements, however,
to ascertain if they directly or indirectly affect present or future trade. See I THE LAW OF
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 9.03(2)(a) (V. Nanda ed. 1985) [hereinafter
cited as V. Nanda].
155 Article 36 provides that articles 30-34 shall not preclude prohibitions on imports
justified on grounds including the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such
prohibitions, however, must not constitute trade discrimination or restrictions between
Member States. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 152, art. 36.
156 Id.
157 See Establissements Costen SARL & Grundig-Verkauf-GmbH v. Comm'n EEC,
1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 299, 345, [1966] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046 at 7654.
For a discussion of Grundig, see V. Nanda, supra note 154, § 9.03(2)(e).
158 See A. HERMANN & C. JONES, supra note 151, at 77.
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ited to unique circumstances.' 59 Consequently, trademarks receive
limited protection under this article. Although trademarks are pro-
tected as industrial and commercial property rights under basic
Community doctrine, the Treaty militates against employing trade-
marks as a means of trade control between the Member States.
Therefore, it is difficult to exclude grey market imports by use of
trademark law within the EEC. 160
The EEC's grey market policy has been consistently developed
in case law over the last two decades. The anti-competitive articles
of the Treaty and the EEC's ability to deal with grey market imports
were initially tested in Establissements Costen SARL & Grundig-Verkauf
GmbH v. Commission des Communautes Europeenes in 1966.161 The issues
in Grundig arose when third parties began importing genuine
Grundig goods from Germany into France after Grundig, a German
manufacturer, granted exclusive distribution rights in France to
plaintiff. Plaintiff, who had sold the Grundig products in France
under its own "GINT" trademark, brought suit in France alleging
infringement of its trademark. The French court delayed action until
the Commission could hear the case. 162 The Commission deter-
mined that the absolute territorial protection which Costen sought
was contrary to article 85.163 Therefore, the Commission permitted
the genuine, albeit grey, Grundig articles to enter the French mar-
ket. 164 The ruling in Grundig prohibits the use of trademarks to ex-
clude grey market imports when the trademark owner and foreign
manufacturer are related enterprises, 65 and invalidates exclusive
distributorship agreements that would provide protection from grey
market imports in the EEC. 166
Some years later, in Sirena S. v. Eda GmbH, the Commission fur-
ther restricted use of trademarks to exclude grey market goods.' 67
159 See S.P.A. Salgoli v. Haitian Ministry for Foreign Trade, 1968 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep.
453, 463, [1967-70 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 352.56.
160 See A. HERMANN & C. JONES, supra note 151, at 44-45.
161 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, [1961-66 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8046.
162 See id. at 304 [1961-66 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046 at 7672.
A. HERMANN & C. JoNEs, supra note 151, at 73. French law provided then, as it does today,
that exclusive distributors may protect their territory through trademark actions. See
Grundig, 1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 369, [1961-66 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8046 at 7672; A. HERMANN & C.JoNEs, supra note 151, at 73. For present French
law, see text at 32.
163 See generally supra note 154.
164 See Grundig, 1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 304, [1961-66 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046 at 7621. See also A. HERMANN & C. JONES, supra note 151, at 73.
165 An example of a related enterprise is exclusive distributor and manufacturer. See
S. HERMANN & C. JONES, supra note 151, at 45.
16 See id. at 73.
167 See 1971 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 69, 83, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8101 at 7112. See also A. HERMANN & C. JoNEs, supra note 151, at 45; V.
Nanda, supra note 154, § 9.03(2)(c).
[VOL. I11
GREY IMPORTS: CRISIS OR POLICY
The case concerned two European companies that had each
purchased exclusive rights to use a U.S. trademark. 168 Sirena had an
exclusive trademark license for Italy, and Eda had a similar license
for Germany.169 Sirena brought suit when Eda attempted to sell the
identically trademarked goods in Italy. 170 The Commission denied
Sirena's claim and expanded the scope of its Grundig decision by
holding that trademarks could not be used to isolate national mar-
kets from less expensive genuine imports even when unrelated en-
terprises were involved.' 7 '
In a series of decisions in the early 1970s, the Commission clari-
fied the relationship between intellectual property rights and free
trade in the EEC. In Deutsche Grammophone GmbH v. Metro-SB-Gross-
markte GmbH & Co. KG the Commission held that an intellectual
property right owner cannot invoke article 36 when that owner or an
authorized third party sells goods covered by the property right in
another EEC country. 172 In Re WEA-Filipacchi Music S.A. the Com-
mission found that a customer agreement violated article 85 because
it established exclusive distributorships by controlling genuine ex-
ports.'17 In Van Zuylen Freres v. HagA. G. the Commission limited the
territoriality principle, holding that exclusive trademark owners can-
not rely on their national laws to prohibit marketing of genuine
goods originating in the EEC.1 74 Ultimately, the Commission ex-
tended this free market policy to non-EEC companies in Re Pittsburgh
Corning Europe, holding that non-EEC parent corporations may not
isolate national markets within the EEC to protect a subsidiary from
lower priced grey market goods.175 Through these cases, the Com-
168 See Sirena, 1971 E. Comm. J. Rep. at 80-81, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8101 at 711.
169 See id.
170 See id.
171 See id. at 84-85, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8101 at
7113. The Commission suggested that consumer confusion was the only basis for exclud-
ing grey market imports, and established a "rule of reason test" to determine if consumers
in fact were misled. See id.
172 See 1971 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 487, 512, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET.
REP. (CCH) 8106 at 7193. See also Treaty of Rome, supra note 152, art. 36; A. HERMANN
& C. JONES, supra note 151, at 78.
173 See 1973 Common Mkt. L.R. D43, D48. See also Centrafarm B.V. and Adriaan de
Peijper v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1975 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8246 (plaintiff exhausted intellectual property rights by mar-
keting drugs in England and could not prevent grey market goods from entering Dutch
market). See V. Nanda, supra note 154, § 9.03(2)(e), for discussion of Merck & Co. v. Ste-
phan B.V., [1981] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8707, which substantially supports Cel-
trafarm; see also HUNNINGS, ANTITRUST CASES FROM COMMON MARKET LAw REPORTS 395
(1976).
174 See 1974 E. Comm. Ct. j. Rep. 731, 755, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8230 at 9133. This case involved a German firm which lost the right to its
Belgian trademark due to wartime expropriation. Its general applicability thus may be
limited. See A. HERMANN & C. JONES, supra note 151, at 45-46.
175 1973 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D2, D7-D8 (E.C. Comm'n-Restr. Practices); see also HUN-
NINGS, supra note 173, at 384.
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mission established a free trade doctrine regarding grey market im-
ports that permits few exceptions.
In 1976 the Commission modified its position holding that the
Treaty of Rome did not prevent a trademark owner from excluding
genuine goods. Nonetheless, the Commission held that exclusion of
genuine imports was permissible only if the trademark holder owned
the mark throughout the EEC and if exclusion would not partition or
isolate EEC markets.176 The Commission also held that genuine im-
ports creating consumer confusion could be excluded if independent
trademark owners subject to different national laws were involved
and exclusion would not create artificial market divisions.177
Recent EEC decisions continue to reflect a free market approach
to grey market goods within the Community. Commercial agree-
ments that exclude grey market goods, without attempting to utilize
import controls, have been challenged and voided by the Commis-
sion. In one case, an agreement between a manufacturer and its dis-
tributors to control grey market goods through discriminatory
warranty and sales services was invalidated under article 85.178 In
addition, the Commission determined that an agreement between a
supplier and distributors which limited grey market trade through
export controls violated EEC law. 179
The EEC has stated firmly that the Community will not tolerate
trade distortions' and anti-competitive pricing produced by an exclu-
sionary policy toward grey market goods. A sampling of other na-
tional laws presents a similar picture. German trademarks may not
be used to keep out genuine goods made lawfully abroad when the
German trademark owner has marketed the good abroad, either di-
rectly or through an affiliate. In France, doctrine and case law seem
to permit exclusive distributorships when they do not concern essen-
tial goods. French law appears to focus on the anti-competitive ef-
fects of trademark enforcement, rather than applying a per se rule.
Swedish law allows importation of grey market goods if the domestic
trademark owner and the foreign manufacturer are part of the same
enterprise. In Denmark, trademark law generally does not provide
protection from grey market goods. Finally, grey market goods have
been permitted to enter Japan since the 1970s. Moreover, an open
grey market policy is now officially endorsed by the Japanese Fair
176 See EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS Grammofon A/S, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 871,
908, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8351 at 7402.
177 See Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C.A. Kapferer & Co., 1976 E.
Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1039, 1061-62, (1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8362 at 7605.
178 See Victor Hasselblad, 24 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 161) 18 (1981), [1982-85 Trans-
fer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,401.
179 See National Panasonic, 25 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 354) 28 (1982), [1982-85
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT REP. (CCH) 10,441.
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Trade Commission. 18 0
Additional international support for a non-exclusionary grey
market policy is found in the recommendations of a United Nations
study authored by the Organization of Economic Co-operation and
Development. The study recommends a free entry approach for
genuine grey market goods legitimately marked abroad when their
exclusion would result in higher prices or anti-competitive effects.181
D. U.S. Government Action
The United States is far from realizing a national grey market
policy. 18 2 Congress and the Executive disagree on the contours U.S.
policy should take. Almost a year before the Duracell action was
concluded at the ITC, a number of senators advocated extending
trademark protection to all U.S. companies faced with grey market
imports, regardless of their relationship to the foreign manufac-
turer.' 83 Protecting consumers, U.S. jobs, and the integrity of U.S.
trademarks are the stated goals of this policy, 184 which would effec-
tively exclude all grey market goods from the U.S. market. In re-
sponse, the Treasury Department contended that regulation 133.21
prevents a U.S. affiliated MNE from excluding importation of au-
thentic goods sold abroad through section 526. As a compromise,
the Administration proposed changing Customs regulations so that a
U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation could protect its exclusive
distributorship of foreign-made goods by registering with the Cus-
toms service. 18 5 In short, the Administration indicated that it would
translate Katzel into a regular Customs' procedure, but would not ex-
tend protection against grey market goods to the limits proposed by
the senators.
180 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RESTRICTIVE
BUSINESS PRACTICES RELATING TO TRADEMARKS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS
ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 19-35 (1978).
181 See id. at 73-74.
182 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 860-62 (view of chairwoman Stern & Comm'r Rohr).
Chairwoman Stern and Commissioner Rohr stated that Duracell presented several new is-
sues relating to the powers of the ITC under § 337 and the use of § 337 to protect U.S.
companies' trademark rights. While § 337 investigations may consider common law and
statutory violations in determining if an unfair act exists, Stern and Rohr doubted that
certain questions of law presented in Duracell rightly could be considered under § 337.
They deemed two sections of the Lanham Act inappropriate for consideration because
Customs regulations provided an adequate procedure and remedy under both sections.
They concluded that these sections were outside the scope of § 337 just as antidumping
and subsidy laws are. See id. at 844-45, 846-47.
183 See Letter from Senators James Abdnor, Bill Bradley, Orrin G. Hatch, Dennis
DeConcini, Alfonse D'Amato, Daniel Moynihan, and Paul Laxalt to Donald Regan, Secre-
tary of the Treasury (Nov. 7, 1983).
184 See id.
185 See Letter from Sec. Donald Regan to Sen. DeConcini (Dec. 23, 1983).
1986] 319
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
V. Conclusion
U.S. policymakers must formulate an effective response to grey
market imports that embraces industrial, international trade, and
consumer concerns, as well as, delineates the protections a U.S.
MNE subsidiary may claim from grey market imports. A number of
factors must be weighed to avoid a blanket exclusion of grey market
goods. An exclusionary policy that creates a trade barrier could
close the U.S. market to a whole range of inexpensive name-brand
goods, creating a series of international and domestic difficulties for
consumers and businesses alike.
Because the grey market problem exists in a period of an in-
flated dollar and a growing trade deficit, economic pressures may
inflame protectionist sentiments against grey market imports. While
a protectionist policy could allow U.S. corporations like Duracell to
isolate the U.S. market from some international competition, and
preserve domestic industry in its present form, long-term imbalances
in international trade would result. Furthermore, such measures of-
fer expedient, yet ill-conceived, relief from an overvalued dollar,
masking the truly deleterious effects of the high dollar on U.S. and
international economies. By creating an artificial barrier to goods
made cheaper by the overvalued dollar, industry and government
would have less incentive to address the fundamental international
trade problems caused by the dollar's valuation.
An international policy-making perspective involves considering
the broad ramifications of an exclusionary grey market policy. Pol-
icy-makers must recognize that competition could be enhanced by
allowing importation of genuine grey market goods. Although such
a policy may temporarily injure domestic trademark holders, the free
flow of goods could further global economic development. 186
It remains to be seen whether the Administration and Congress
can formulate an effective response to grey market goods. Whatever
form the policy eventually takes, it will have to consider trademark
law and international, as well as national, trade ramifications.
186 See Greer, Control of Terms and Conditions for International Transfers of Technology to De-
veloping Countries, COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 71-72 (0. Schachter & R. Hel-
lawell eds. 1981).
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